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ABSTRACT. Most (but not all) Pacific island communities achieved self-government 
in the last half of the 20th century. However, they still remain highly dependent 
economically on larger and wealthier patron-nations. Drawing on the available 
literature, this paper critically examines competing models of their dependence and 
its governance implications. In doing so, it gives particular attention to the MIRAB 
model. The MIRAB model of Pacific island micro-economies was developed in the 
mid-1980s by the New Zealand academics, Bertram and Watters, and dominated the 
literature on the economics of small island nations and economies until alternative 
models were proposed two decades later. Nevertheless, it is still an influential theory. 
MIRAB is an acronym for migration (MI), remittance (R) and foreign aid (A) and 
the public bureaucracy (B); the components of the MIRAB model. The nature of this 
model is explained and the importance of distinguishing between the two processes 
involved in it (one based on foreign aid and the other on overseas remittance) is 
emphasized. Evidence is given of the importance of migration and overseas remittance 
for the functioning of some Pacific island microstates, such as Tonga. Yet, it is 
argued that no single model adequately typifies the economic situations of Pacific 
microstates and micro-economies because of their diversity. Even economies that 
have been classified as MIRAB economies can be very different. The newer 
TOURAB, SITE and PROFIT models have similar limitations. In order to under- 
stand adequately the economic situation of Pacific island microstates (including their 
economic vulnerability, their sustainability, and political susceptibilities), it is neces- 
sary to adopt a more holistic approach which takes account of historical, cultural and 
environmental factors. This is illustrated by the case of Nauru. It is shown that the 
international economic dependence of Pacific island microstates and their environ- 
mental vulnerabilities have made them susceptible to political influence by patron 
nations. This has important implications for international affairs. Furthermore, new 
patron nations, such as China, are emerging, as traditional donors reduce their aid to 
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Pacific island nations. This concerns their traditional donor countries. Reasons for 
relevant changes in international relations in the Pacific are suggested, and the im- 
pact of political independence on the economic fortunes of microstates is considered. 
Despite the limitations of existing models of the external economic and political 
dependence of microstates, it is found that they are useful starting points for  
selectively assessing external economic relations and changes in these. 
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Most Pacific island communities obtained self government in the second half 
of the 20th century. The main exceptions are the French possessions, for 
example, French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Despite many achieving self 
government, virtually all Pacific island communities remain highly dependent 
economically on larger or wealthier patron nations. This is partly a result of 
their small territorial size; low levels of population; in many cases their 
limited availability of natural resources, and other economic disadvantages 
such as small home markets, fragmented territory and remoteness from major 
metropolitan economic countries (see, for example, Connell, 2010). While 
self-government provided increased scope for their local determination of 
national affairs and for them to independently participate in international 
relations, the scope for doing so has been significantly limited by their need 
to seek economic support from larger nations in the form of foreign aid and 
to ensure the continuing possibility of their citizens to migrate to overseas 
countries. Drawing on the available literature, this article outlines and criti- 
cally examines various models which highlight the nature of the continuing 
economic dependence of Pacific island communities on larger economies. 
The implications are discussed of this continuing economic dependence for 
their political independence and for international relations. 
 Most attention is given to the MIRAB model because it is the model most 
commonly proposed for typifying the economic situation of small island 
states and was the earliest model developed to typify their situation. The 
MIRAB model (which outlines the way in which several small island econo- 
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mies in the Pacific manage to remain sustainable, despite their comparative 
lack of domestic economic production) was developed by two New Zealand 
academics; Bertram and Watters (1985). It is based on the observation that 
these economies rely heavily on remittances from their emigrants and funds 
provided by foreign aid. As pointed out by Bertram (2006), this model has 
been widely accepted and applied not only in the Pacific but also to some 
small economies elsewhere. Bertram (2006, p. 12) expresses the view that 
the MIRAB model is likely to continue to be applicable to many small island 
nations well into this century. Nevertheless, as is pointed out here, changes 
in the nature of the operation of the model are to be expected, and it is 
doubtful if it captures adequately the diverse way in which the economies of 
small island nations in the Pacific operate and have developed. 
 In this article, the basic structure of the MIRAB model is outlined and 
studies are reviewed which provide support for it. The applicability of the 
model is then discussed and changes in the nature of its operation and future 
applicability are considered. This is followed by a brief discussion of security, 
sustainability and vulnerability issues involving small island nations in the 
Pacific. A brief note is added on the case of Nauru. In the penultimate 
section, attention is given to the appearance of new patrons of Pacific island 
states, such as China and Indonesia. Changes in the foreign policies of tradi- 
tional patron states are among the factors providing opportunities for new 
economic patrons to emerge. Also the extent to which self-government is 
associated with economic benefit is discussed.   
 This topic is important because it demonstrates the close links between 
economic realities and political power relationships and highlights changes 
that are starting to occur in these relationships in the Pacific. It is found that 
although the various models which have been proposed for typifying the 
external economic dependence of microstates do not capture the situation of 
all, they nevertheless, provide useful starting points for analyzing their ex- 
ternal economic relations and changes in these. Nevertheless, they should be 
regarded as “ideal” types. 
 
2. The MIRAB Model, Evidence Supporting It and Its Consequences 
 
MIRAB is an acronym for Migration (MI) Remittances (R), Foreign Aid (A) 
and the Public Bureaucracy (B); the essential components of the MIRAB 
model. It has been claimed that many small economies in the Pacific islands 
rely on these four elements to sustain the economic welfare of their popu- 
lation (see, for example, Bertram and Watters, 1985; 1986; Bertram, 1986; 
2006). There is convincing evidence that this is so for some, for instance, the 
Cook Islands, Samoa and Tonga. It has also been applied to French overseas 
departments and territories in the Pacific by Poirine (1994; 1998). 
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 It is helpful to decompose the MIRAB model into two distinct processes: 
(1) the aid process and (2) the emigration and remittance process. These 
operate as follows:  
• Process I depends on the provision of foreign aid which in MIRAB econ- 
omies is mainly used to fund the government bureaucracy. This aid provides 
income for public servants and a portion of this is remitted to their relatives, 
especially those who lack access to cash income. Expenditure by public ser- 
vants (by those receiving their remittances) adds to additional employment 
and to cash incomes in MIRAB economies, for example, in retailing, via a 
multiplier effect. Nevertheless, typically, the import leakage from this ex- 
penditure is high. In cases where foreign aid is tied, this leakage is especially 
high. 
• Process II involves the sending of remittances by emigrants from MIRAB 
economies to relatives (and to others) remaining at home. In turn, the spend- 
ing of those remittances has a local multiplier effect on incomes and employ- 
ment but this is damped by a high import leakage.  
 Figure 1 highlights the first of these processes and Figure 2 represents the 
second of these processes. 
 
Figure 1 The primary mechanics by which the flow of foreign aid 
sustains the functioning of MIRAB economies 
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Figure 2 The primary mechanisms by which the flow of overseas remittances 
                      sustain the functioning of MIRAB economies 
 
There is strong evidence that globally the total amount of international remit- 
tances to developing countries significantly exceeds the total value of their 
Official Development Assistance (Ratha and Silwal, 2012), and this is prob- 
ably so for most MIRAB economies in the Pacific. With foreign aid being 
reduced by countries such as Australia and the USA, many MIRAB econo- 
mies are likely to become relatively more dependent on Process II, the flow of 
overseas remittances from their emigrants, in order to maintain the economic 
welfare of their inhabitants. In addition, they are likely to seek foreign aid 
from other emerging donors such as China and even Indonesia, especially if 
their emigration possibilities are restricted. 
 Tonga’s economy is heavily dependent on remittances from its overseas 
migrants. The nature and role of these remittances has been studied in depth 
by Richard P.C. Brown of The University of Queensland. Jimenez-Soto and 
Brown (2012, p. 426) report that “as many as 60 per cent of all households in 
Tonga have at least one overseas migrant, and 90 per cent of households 
receive remittances.” 
 Brown, Connell and Jimenez-Soto (2013) find from studies of remittances 
by Tongans (and more recently by Fijians) that these are used mostly for 
consumption rather than for investment. They argue, however, that this should 
not be deprecated because these remittances play an important role in poverty 
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alleviation and in providing social protection. Jimenez-Soto and Brown (2012) 
conclude from their detailed study of the role of migrants’ remittances in 
Tonga that these remittances reduced the incidence of poverty by 31 per cent. 
Furthermore, Brown, Leeves and Prayaga (2013) found that considerable social 
pressure is exerted on migrants (often through their church affiliations) to 
donate extra funds when natural disasters strike their Pacific homelands. 
 A significant side-effect of both the MIRAB processes illustrated by 
Figures 1 and 2 is that they encourage migration to central urban areas from 
the peripheries of Pacific microstates. A couple of processes induce this 
internal migration process. First, the public bureaucracy is mostly located in 
central urban areas and this is where the greatest scope exists for locals to 
earn income in the form of cash. Secondly, those receiving remittances have 
reduced economic incentives to remain in remote locations and the “bright-
lights” of urban areas become more attractive to them. There is also greater 
access to services (such as medical services and education) in urban areas 
and a greater variety of commodities are available in metropolitan areas and 
this also attracts individuals from outlying locations to central places. Sofer 
(2009) provides an example of this center-periphery issue for Fiji but it is 
even more marked in countries, such as Kiribati. This internal centralization 
process reduces the extent of economic self-reliance of Pacific island nations.  
 This discussion raises some important questions. Why do some Pacific 
microstates rely heavily on continuing foreign aid and international remit- 
tances for their economic welfare? Why are remittances (and aid) used 
mainly for consumption (“unproductive” purposes) rather than for investment 
(“productive” purposes) in many Pacific microstates? One possibility is that 
the returns on investments in some of these economies are low or negative 
and the scope for investments giving positive returns at home are limited 
(Tisdell, 2007). This is probably one reason why the governments of Tuvalu 
and Kiribati invest most of their capital funds abroad (namely the Tuvalu 
Trust Fund and the Reserve Equalisation Reserve Fund respectively) (Tisdell, 
2000a; 2000b). Bertram (2006, p. 2) observed that there were limited oppor- 
tunities for commercial economic investment in the MIRAB economies which 
he and Watters studied (Bertram and Watters, 1985). However, Pacific micro- 
states are diverse (Tisdell, 1996; 2002; 2007; 2008a) and the extent to which 
commercial investment in them can yield positive returns varies. For example, 
the scope for productive investments is likely to be less in island nations 
consisting of atolls (for example, Kiribati and Tuvalu) than in those with 
islands that are mainly of volcanic origin (Fiji) or which are primarily of a 
continental type (New Caledonia). 
 If there is little scope for positive returns from investment in commercial 
production in Pacific microstates, then an alternative possible way to sustain 
their economies is by obtaining foreign aid and receiving international remit- 
 13 
tances. It also follows that there is little scope for aid to act as a catalyst for 
developing self-sustaining commercial production in these microstates. Fur- 
thermore, the investment of remittances locally for productive purposes will 
be infrequent if negative returns are likely in most cases. An additional con- 
sideration is that a higher return may be obtained by investing in offspring 
(to increase their human capital) in order to facilitate their emigration and 
subsequently, their remittances. Poirine (1997) has studied this aspect in 
detail as far as investment in the education of children in MIRAB economies 
is concerned and stresses its importance.  
 It also follows too that many microstates in the Pacific are unable to de- 
velop by applying the liberal economic principles of the Washington Consensus. 
The smallest states (Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu for example) are severely 
restricted in their ability to profitably export goods, although some micro- 
states are able to benefit from trade in services, such as tourism (Fiji) or by 
acting as a tax haven for banking and finance (Vanuatu). 
 At the same time as major traditional donors to Pacific Microstates, such 
as Australia and the United States, have reduced their foreign aid to these 
nations, they have encouraged them to make greater use of private enterprise 
and free markets to increase their GDP and reduce their reliance on the 
government sector. On the whole, these policies have not met with success 
primarily because most of these countries have very limited opportunities to 
engage in profitable economic opportunities. This point of view is supported 
by the recent analysis of Hezel (2012) who points out (p. 27) that the “con- 
ventional pathways for economic development in the Pacific have offered 
limited success” and “most Pacific Island nations will require continuing 
outside financial assistance to make them viable as modern nation-states.” 
Liberal market-type reforms are seen by traditional Pacific Rim patrons as an 
alternative to dependence on foreign aid. However, as Hezel (2012, p. 28) 
concludes: “As well-conceived as these reforms may be, they will all but 
certainly be unable to transform the islands, with their limited economic 
potential, into self-sustaining nations.” 
 
3. How Widely Applicable Is the MIRAB Model to Microstates? 
 
The question has arisen of the extent to which the economies of Pacific 
island microstates satisfy the MIRAB model. First, it can be said that the 
model glosses over significant differences in factors sustaining the economies 
of microstates that have been classified as MIRAB economies. For example, 
Bertram (2006, p. 7, Figure 1) classifies Samoa and Tonga, Kiribati and 
Tuvalu as MIRAB economies but in several ways, they are as different as 
“chalk and cheese.” The economies of Samoa and Tonga differ substantially 
in their size and diversity and their physical geography compared to the much 
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smaller states of Kiribati and Tuvalu. This incidentally raises the question of 
what criteria should be used to determine what is an island microstate or a 
micro-economy? How small must it be? “Small” is a relative term and many 
dimensions can be used to determine its application. Consequently, judgment 
is involved in categorizing an economy or a state as small. For example, Fiji 
has a large economy compared to Tuvalu, but Fiji’s economy is small com- 
pared to Australia’s. 
 Secondly, while remittances make an important contribution to the eco- 
nomic functioning of many Pacific microstates, those received by Samoa and 
Tonga are largely a function of permanent overseas migration of family 
members. Both Tuvalu and Kirabati are much more dependent on remittances 
from family members able to obtain only short-term employment abroad, for 
example, the employment of merchant marines from these countries by Ger- 
man shipping lines and those on short-term employment contracts in Australia 
and New Zealand. Consequently, the sources of remittances of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu are much more vulnerable to changing economic conditions abroad 
than are those of Samoa and Tonga. For instance, there is intense competi- 
tion from other nations, such as Pakistan, to supply crew for merchant ships. 
Furthermore, both Kiribati and Tuvalu are comparatively more dependent on 
rents from fishing rights within their Exclusive Economic Zones than are 
Samoa and Tonga. These rents are obtained from distant water fishing nations. 
As pointed out by Boland and Dollery (2006), the microstate of Tuvalu, 
which at first sight might be thought to conform with the MIRAB model, has 
its own peculiarities which result in it not being an exact fit at all.  
 Thirdly, it has become quite clear that many small island economies 
cannot be classified as MIRAB economies. For instance, McElroy (2006) 
highlighted the fact that the economies of some island microstates depend 
heavily on inbound tourism. The acronym SITEs (Small Island Tourist Econ- 
omies) was developed to describe these economies. A third category of 
island microstates has been developed by Baldacchino (2006) for which he 
coined the acronym, PROFIT. This somewhat abstruse acronym consists of 
the following components: P (people considerations); R (resource manage- 
ment); O (overseas engagement); IF (finance, insurance and taxation); and T 
(transportation). Baldacchino highlights the ability of small nations to make 
strategic political decisions in the global context which enhance their eco- 
nomic welfare, for example, act as tax havens, provide flags of convenience 
for shipping, obtain rents from their natural resources and benefit from the 
presence of military installations. In some instances, these attributes are 
combined with tourism, foreign aid and remittances. 
 A fourth classification of the economies of some small island states also 
exists and was suggested by Guthunz and von Krosigh (1996) prior to the 
SITES and PROFIT models. It is the TOURAB aid and bureaucracy model. 
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It typifies those economies that depend heavily on tourism and the distribu- 
tion of aid via the public bureaucracy. It has received little coverage in the 
literature.  
 The TOURAB, SITEs and PROFIT models underline the diverse nature 
of small island economies. Bertram (2006) accepts the existence of this 
diversity and uses it to provide a global taxonomy of island microstates. He 
classifies economies according to the extent to which they satisfy MIRAB, 
SITE or PROFIT characteristics. Oberst and McElroy (2007, p. 175) also 
provide a classification of small island nations according to whether they 
satisfy the MIRAB model or the combined PROFIT-SITE models. Note that 
not all the economies classified by Bertram (2006) and Oberst and McElroy 
(2007) are those of sovereign states: some are political dependencies and 
overseas territories of sovereign states. However, in neither of these publica- 
tions are detailed reasons given for including particular island economies in 
one category rather than another. No quantification is provided. For instance, 
while Bertram (2006) classifies the Cook Islands as being predominantly a 
MIRAB economy, Oberst and McElroy (2007) place it in the PROFIT-SITE 
category. Both Bertram (2006) and Oberst and McElroy (2007) identify 
Tuvalu and Kiribati as having a MIRAB economy, but this fails to take 
account of their significant rents obtained from distant water fishing nations 
for access to fish (mainly tuna) in their very large Exclusive Economic Zones. 
Furthermore, as mentioned above, there is failure to highlight adequately the 
extent to which these nations depend on overseas remittances based on 
relatively short-term employment contracts. 
 Each of these models is intended to identify theoretical (“ideal”) types but 
the PROFIT model is rather elastic or “hazy.” Oberst and McElroy (2007, p. 
165) claim that “the three aspects that distinguish PROFIT from MIRAB 
models are: the dynamism of the private sector, the active role of domestic 
policy, and the strategic orientation towards diversification. PROFIT examples 
would include tax and insurance havens, offshore banking centers and duty-
free manufacturing exporters.” The way in which the various dimensions of 
the PROFIT model can be measured are unclear. In fact, many of its dimen- 
sions do not seem to be quantifiable. On the other hand, the components of 
the MIRAB models can be measured, even though official statistics on 
remittances are inadequate because remittances are often made informally or 
directly by islanders and are, therefore, unrecorded. 
 
4. Security, Sustainability and Vulnerability:  
    Issues Involving Pacific Island Microstates 
 
It is generally accepted that island microstates are economically more vul- 
nerable than larger nations. Reasons for the economic vulnerability of island 
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microstates have been outlined by Briguglio (1995). Factors which contribute 
to their economic vulnerability include: 
• Their lack of economic diversification in exported commodities and their 
lack of scope for such diversification given their limited resources; 
• Many are prone to natural disasters (such as cyclones and tsunamis) and, 
unlike large nations, they have limited resources to respond to such disasters 
which often impact on a large proportion of their population; and  
• Land-based subsistence crops (which in some Pacific Islands provide a 
buffer against commercial economic instability) may be destroyed or severely 
damaged by natural disasters. 
 
The economic vulnerability hypothesis has, however, not been accepted 
without dissent. According to Bertram (2006, p. 2): “In a globalizing world, 
inhabitants of small island economies have open to them a myriad of evolu- 
tionary responses to external forces that potentially enable them to seize 
niches of opportunity, and thereby insulate themselves from global economic 
shocks.” This is a similar theme to that expressed by Baldacchino (2006). 
However, I believe it to be too sweeping a view. For example, while Brown, 
Connell et al. (2013) accept that island microstates in the Pacific are eco- 
nomically vulnerable, they also point out that some, such as Samoa and Tonga, 
are significantly insulated by their access to and dependence on overseas 
remittances. Despite this, many Pacific island economies do not have access 
to significant remittances, for example, that of the Solomon Islands. However, 
the Solomon Islands did receive a major cash injection as a result of RAMSI 
(the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands) which resulted in 
the stationing of a sizeable security contingent there led by Australia (Anon, 
2014). The last of this contingent left in August, 2013 and so this source of 
cash inflow stopped. There are also worrying signs that the incidence of 
poverty is rising in Pacific microstates for example, in Tonga, despite its 
being able to access a high level of overseas remittances (Jimenez-Soto and 
Brown, 2012). Furthermore, aid donors are liable to cut their level of aid 
when they experience economic difficulties at home, demand for the exports 
of those island economies that have significant exports are liable to drop, and 
the inflow of overseas tourists to island economies is likely to be curtailed by 
difficult economic conditions abroad.  
 
Sustainability 
The question is often posed of whether the MIRAB model of economic 
dependence can be sustained. In particular, for how long will those who have 
migrated from MIRAB economies and their progeny continue to send remit- 
tances to their kin in island economies? Some reduction in the willingness to 
send remittances can be expected with the passage of time. In order to ensure 
the long-term sustainability of the remittance system, continuous emigration 
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is required. This however, is only possible if countries receiving Pacific 
Islanders as migrants continue to be willing to receive them. This is by no 
means assured (see, for example, Friberg et al., 2006). 
 As far as I am aware, there are no available comprehensive statistics of 
population and labor movements between Pacific islands and from and to 
Pacific island microstates and territories. It would be useful to have such 
information. 
 In a few cases, the sustainability of the economies of some microstates 
have depended on the mining of non-renewable resources, such as phosphate 
in the case of Nauru; an unsustainable economic activity. Several states also 
rely on income from renewable but depletable resources, such as tuna. There 
is always a risk of these resources being exploited in a sub-optimal way, and 
even being exhausted, problems not unknown in the Pacific (McDaniel and 
Gowdy, 2000).  
 A serious problem for Pacific island microstates consisting of low-lying 
islands (such as coral atolls) is the likelihood of sea level rise as a result of 
global warming (Tisdell, 2008b). Eventually these nations will become un- 
inhabitable, and their inhabitants will become environmental refugees. For 
example, Kiribati and Tuvalu are at particular risk of this. In many cases, 
defensive actions (mitigation) of sea level rise can be expected to be in- 
effective and uneconomic. No doubt such small microstates will look to other 
nations, such as Australia, to accept their environmental refugees. 
 
Political vulnerability 
Despite the hypothesis of Baldocchino (2006) that island microstates have 
considerable ability to manipulate larger nations to their advantage, it seems 
more likely that larger higher income countries have the upper hand in this 
regard. For example, both Nauru and Papua New Guinea were probably more 
willing to accept boat people (refugees) for offshore processing from Australia 
because of their considerable dependence on Australian foreign aid. Australia 
also wants to have friendly relations with Indonesia and both sides of Aus- 
tralian politics recognize Indonesian sovereignty of West Papua (Chauvel, 
2012). The Australian Government does not support the Free West Papua 
Movement (Chauvel, 2012), and in turn may expect Papua New Guinea to do 
likewise. In that regard, Australia has leverage via the considerable amount 
of aid it provides to Papua New Guinea. There are also doubts about whether 
Timor Leste has received an equitable deal in relation to Australian access to 
its offshore oil and gas, especially since it has been alleged that Australia 
spied on East Timor at the time an agreement was being negotiated with East 
Timor for Australian access to these resources (Lamb, 2014). This matter has 
been referred by the Government of Timor Leste to the International Court 
for Justice in The Hague.  
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 An interesting question is why does Australia not make it easier for in- 
dividuals from Pacific microstates to migrate to Australia permanently? The 
populations of some of these states (for example, Nauru and Tuvalu) are so 
small that the migration of their residents to Australia would have a minis- 
cule impact on Australia’s total population. It may also be less costly than 
providing aid (Tisdell, 1990, Ch. 10). Is it because pressures might emerge 
from larger Pacific Island states for a similar deal? Or is it a matter of 
strategic military concern? For example, if some microstates were to become 
depopulated, would they be taken over by potentially hostile foreign nations?  
 There are also other unresolved questions: What would happen to the 
sovereignty of a nation state if all of its population migrated to another state? 
If all the land mass of a sovereign state (for example, Tuvalu) should be 
submerged by sea level rise, would it lose all of its existing territorial rights? 
If one of more of the islands of a sovereign state (for instance, Kiribati) should 
be submerged by sea level rise, would its exclusive economic (maritime) zone 
be correspondingly reduced? 
 Some Pacific islands provide important strategic military bases, such as 
Guam for the United States, and may become more important as tensions 
escalate on territorial claims by Northeast Asian countries to areas in the 
Pacific Ocean. However, Australia’s military bases are on its mainland with 
its forward bases being in its far north. Nevertheless, one understands the 
concerns of the United States and Australia about securing defensive outposts 
in the Pacific. On the other hand one wonders why France maintains a 
significant military presence in French Polynesia when it no longer has pos- 
sessions in Asia, such as in Indo-China. Is it merely to provide a politically 
acceptable form of aid to French Polynesia? Or is it to bolster the appearance 
of France as a global political power? 
 It might be thought that because French Polynesia is a French overseas 
territory (and therefore, not a sovereign state) it ought not be classified as a 
MIRAB, TOURAB or similar economy. However, the boundaries of an 
economy do not have to coincide with that of a sovereign state. Depending 
on the purpose, and subject to some judgment, the economies of regions and 
other geographical areas can be analyzed (including the economy of French 
Polynesia) even when they do not constitute sovereign states. In fact, Poirine 
(1994) has applied the MIRAB model to French overseas departments and 
territories in the Pacific. 
 
5. Brief Notes on the Case of Nauru 
 
To some extent, every Pacific island microstate is unique. This is highlighted 
by the case of Nauru. It is not an archipelago (unlike most Pacific island 
microstates) but consists of a small single island formed by a raised coral bed.  
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 In 1888, Nauru became a German Protectorate and in 1906 (as a result of 
a British initiative) a German and British consortium was formed to mine its 
phosphate deposits which was in particular demand for fertilizer in Australia. 
 Although Germany lost its possessions in the Pacific as a result of World 
War I (Nauru was placed in 1919 under the trusteeship of the UK, Australia 
and New Zealand), phosphate mining on Nauru continued. It was occupied 
by the Japanese in World War II and reoccupied by Australian troops in 1945. 
Nauru was again placed under the trusteeship of Australia, New Zealand and 
the UK in 1947 and administered by Australia. It became a totally independent 
nation on January 31, 1968. McDaniel and Gowdy (2000) state that between 
1909 and 1966, Nauruans received little or no economic benefit from phos- 
phate mining on their island. Furthermore, they point out that “mining under 
occupation and then trusteeship had left more than a third of the island in a 
state of complete destruction” (McDaniel and Gowdy, 2000, p. 45). A later 
source (Anon, 2013, p. 6) claims: “the phosphate reserves on Nauru are 
almost entirely depleted. Phosphate mining in the central plateau has left a 
barren terrain of jagged limestone pinnacles up to 15 meters (40 ft) high. 
Mining has devastated about 80 per cent of Nauru’s land area [and a con- 
siderable amount of marine life surrounding the island has been killed by silt 
and phosphate runoff].” 
 As a result of pressure from Nauruans and UN bodies, more generous 
phosphate royalties were paid to Nauru in the two years preceding its inde- 
pendence (McDaniel and Gowdy, 2000, p. 45), and a portion of these was 
placed in the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust. By the time of its indepen- 
dence, Nauru’s phosphate deposits were virtually exhausted. Returns from 
investments by the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust were intended to provide 
a continuing source of income for Nauru but due to unwise investments and 
use of these funds by the government to cover budget deficits, they were 
almost exhausted by the beginning of this century (Anon, 2013), thereby 
leaving Nauru in a dire economic state because it had few alternative ways to 
earn income. It therefore, became highly dependent on foreign aid provided 
mainly by Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan. In addition, Australia agreed 
in 1993 as a result of an out of court settlement to pay Nauru $107 million 
(Australian) to rehabilitate the mined areas of the island (McDaniel and 
Gowdy, 2000, p. 46). However, I could not find evidence of any significant 
rehabilitation having been done. 
 Given its difficult economic situation, Nauru has had to consider every 
possibility for earning income from external sources. In the 1990s, it became 
a tax haven and a base for money laundering but under pressure from the 
inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, it 
changed its policy in 2003. It has also welcomed the opportunity to house 
those seeking asylum in Australia and arriving “irregularly” by boat in return 
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for extra Australian aid. This is a part of Australia’s Pacific Solution to stem 
the arrival of boat people arriving via Indonesia. The Nauruan detention 
center operated from 2001–2007 then closed but was reopened again in 
August 2012. Presumably, this center will not provide Nauru with a secure 
long-term source of income. 
 Nauru has some other sources of income such as royalties from fishing 
rights, but these are quite limited. Furthermore, by world standards, its net 
migration rate is low. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (2013) reports 
that the estimated net migration rate of Nauru in 2013 was 14.63 migrants 
per 1,000 of its population which suggests that (unlike Samoa, Tonga and 
several other microstates in the Pacific) it cannot rely on international re- 
mittances for its economic sustainability. The CIA (2013) also reports that 
Nauru has no defense forces and that Australia is responsible for its defense.  
 While there is some evidence that Nauru has used its jurisdictional power 
for manipulative purposes (for example, in changing its recognition of the 
People’s Republic of China and Taiwan), its global manipulative power 
appears to be limited and in acting as a haven for money laundering, it did 
not escape international attention (Drezner, 2001). Baldacchino (2006) 
claims that microstates are so small that their support of economic activities 
regarded internationally as dubious, undesirable or illegal are not noticed and 
do not result in any international retaliatory action. Thus, Nauru does not 
fully comply with Baldacchino’s PROFIT model although it is true that 
several sovereign microstates in the Pacific trade their votes in international 
fora in return for extra aid and other economic benefits from larger nations 
and do support international economic activities of “borderline” nature 
(Drezner, 2001). However, many of these activities are not sustainable and 
depend on sporadic opportunities (Drezner, 2001). In addition, Nauru is not 
a magnet for tourism and therefore, does not fit the SITE of the TOURAB 
model either. Nor does it appear to comply with the MIRAB model. Bertram 
(2006, p. 7) does not include it in his taxonomy of microstates based on this 
model but Oberst and McElroy (2007, p. 175) classify it as being a MIRAB 
economy. Despite this, it is an economy which depends much more on 
foreign aid than on overseas remittances. This is not clear if it is classified as 
a MIRAB economy. In fact, like most Pacific island microstates, Nauru has 
special characteristics which can only be appreciated by considering its 
historical background and its special circumstances. It is only by taking into 
account these aspects that one can understand the challenging economic 






6. Additional Issues – The Emergence of New Patron Nations  
    in the Pacific and the Relationship between the Political Status  
    of Island Communities and their Economic Fortunes 
 
External influences on Pacific small island economies have changed consider- 
ably in recent decades. China has become a major aid donor and Indonesia 
has started to give aid to some Melanesian countries. Secondly, there appear 
to be no strong demands for self government by those countries that do not 
have it. To some extent these developments reflect economic realities. Let us 
consider each of these aspects briefly in turn.  
 
New foreign aid patrons in the Pacific Islands 
China has become a major global donor of foreign aid. The volume of its 
foreign aid increased noticeably from the late 1990s onwards. JICA estimated 
that China was in 2013 the sixth largest donor of global aid with the amount 
of its foreign aid only being exceeded by that of the UK, US, Germany, 
France and Japan (Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2015). Moreover, 
Brant (2015) reports that China is on track to overtake Japan as the third 
largest donor in the Pacific and within a few years could overtake the United 
States as the second largest donor. However, she does not take account of 
financial assistance to French territories and dependencies in the Pacific in her 
rankings, presumably because this assistance is not counted as foreign aid.  
 The increased involvement of China in international affairs and its use of 
foreign aid as a policy instrument was to be expected given the success of its 
economic reforms and its opening up to the outside world. As a consequence 
of its economic reforms and open-door policies (Tisdell, 2009), China is no 
longer as economically self-reliant as it used to be but it remains staunchly 
independent and self-reliant politically (Tisdell, 2013). Apart from altruism, 
there are several reasons why China, like most other nations giving foreign 
aid, may see it as advantageous to provide foreign aid. These reasons prob- 
ably include: 
• The strengthening of China’s access to natural resources which it can 
import on favorable terms; 
• Facilitating its foreign direct investment in countries receiving aid; 
• Helping to increase market-access for its exports; and 
• Increasing China’s global political influence and standing. 
 
According to Brant (2015), China is now the largest bilateral donor by far in 
Fiji and the second largest bilateral donor in the Cook Islands, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa and Tonga. Consequently, she (ibid.) raises the following issue: 
 
The size of China’s aid program at both regional and individual 
country levels begs the question of whether traditional patrons will 
continue to set the regional development agenda at least to the 
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extent they are accustomed. Increasing amounts of Chinese aid can 
potentially give more bargaining power to Pacific Island govern- 
ments when negotiating for development assistance – either by 
playing partners off one another or by turning to China to find 
projects that others may not. 
 
This fits in well with Baldacchino’s theory. He suggests that small island 
nations “call the tune” as far as foreign aid is concerned. On the other hand, 
since much of China’s recent aid is in the form of concessional and other 
loans (not grants), it is also possible that aid recipients in this region may 
have little scope to maneuver politically if they become heavily indebted to 
China. Moreover, traditional donors may be put in the invidious position of 
being asked for increased aid by indebted Pacific island nations unable to 
repay their loans to China. Brant (2015) points out that it is highly likely that 
several Pacific island recipients of loans from China will default on repay- 
ments. Western observers have raised several criticisms of China’s aid policies. 
These include the prevalence of tied aid (for example, Svizzero and Tisdell, 
2016) and insufficient attention being given by China to the ability of loan 
recipients to repay loans (Brant, 2015). 
 It should be noted that China’s increase in aid and assistance to Pacific 
island nations has been facilitated by the reduction in these forms of support 
by traditional donors, increased migration restrictions, and the belief that struc- 
tural adjustment and market liberalization in these economies can be used to 
offset the negative economic effect on them of the aforementioned policies. 
 A second interesting development is that in June, 2015, Indonesia became 
an associate member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group and since 2011 has 
been increasing its aid to the Member States of the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia in Doha, 2015). Presumably, 
one of the main purposes of this is to counter any support of members of the 
Melanesian Spearhead Group for the United Liberation Movement for West 
Papua. West Papua, like Papua New Guinea, is rich in natural resources. 
 Although Pacific island microstates are considered on the whole to be poor 
in terms of natural resources, their position is complicated. Some only have a 
single resource of considerable economic value. In the case of Kiribati and 
Tuvalu, this is the presence of tuna in their exclusive economic zones. Some 
are more fortunate. However, none have the amount of capital, expertise and 
market access to take advantage of those natural resources which are rela- 
tively abundant, but many larger nations do. This partly explains the interest 
of some larger nations in giving aid to these countries to facilitate their access 





The political status of island communities and their economic fortunes 
Those small island communities which have retained a close association with 
their former colonial powers and which are not politically independent (or 
only independent to a limited extent) appear to have fared better economi- 
cally than those which have become politically independent. This relationship 
appears to have been initially investigated by Bertram (2004). This hypothesis 
has subsequently been supported by the research of Dunn (2011) and by 
McElroy and Parry (2012). It seems that less politically independent terri- 
tories benefit from greater levels of aid from their metropolitan patrons and 
have more opportunities for emigration and consequently, for remittances. 
They also enjoy other advantages as well which are identified by Dunn 
(2011). Bertram (2004, p. 343) states that “in the small-island setting, there 
has been no tradeoff between political dependence and material welfare, the 
two go hand in hand.”  
 
7. Concluding Comments 
 
It is doubtful if any of the simple models for describing the economies of 
island microstates and dependencies (the MIRAB, TOURAB, SITE and 
PROFIT models) adequately explain the economic situations that Pacific 
island economies now face because they do not take enough account of 
historical and cultural factors as well as matters of location. These models do 
not seem to explain (for example) why the economies of Singapore, Hong 
Kong, Malta, Nauru, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Federated States of Micronesia 
are so different. The historical association of the Pacific island microstates 
with Australia, France, New Zealand and the USA are of considerable impor- 
tance for their economic functioning but the way in which these relationships 
have come about requires delving into the historical background of their 
development. This is underlined by the case of Nauru. Today, China has also 
taken a greater interest in many of these Pacific microstates as part of its 
growing global influence. This could become a concern for those nations (such 
as Australia, New Zealand and USA) that have had the greatest external 
influence on these microstates in recent decades. 
 The possibility that the populations of some of these microstates (for 
example, Nauru and the Solomon Islands) could sink into abject poverty is 
another concern, and the problem of how several of these microstates will 
cope with predicted sea-level rises is unresolved. Apart from this, serious 
health problems exist in several Pacific states close to Australia. For example, 
the incidence of malaria is high in the Solomon Islands and in Papua New 
Guinea and in the latter country, tuberculosis (including a strain resistant to 
antibiotics) is relatively common. These problems are occurring virtually on 
Australia’s doorstep. However, it seems likely that Australia will do even 
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less in the future to help address these issues because with the election of 
Tony Abbott as Prime Minister in the latter part of 2013, the Australian 
government has substantially reduced the amount of its foreign aid, but has 
limited reductions in aid to Pacific island nations. The United States is also 
reducing aid to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands 
(Friberg et al., 2006) but these states may be able to sustain their economies 
as a result of remittances. However, not all Pacific island states are able to 
do this, because of external obstacles to the migration of their citizens.  
Furthermore, the US may add obstacles to migration from Micronesia and 
the Marshall Islands as indicated by Friberg et al. (2006, pp. 130–131). This 
would undoubtedly result in great economic hardship for residents of these 
nations, especially if they experience major adverse consequences from 
climate change. 
 It is clear also that the policies of traditional patrons of Pacific island 
states encouraging these states to adopt market-led development have not 
been a success, as has been pointed out by Hezel (2012). They have not 
resulted in sufficient economic growth to compensate Pacific microstates for 
reduced foreign aid provided by their traditional patrons. In these circum- 
stances, it is little wonder that many Pacific island microstates have been 
forced to search for new patrons, such as China. One would expect them to 
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